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ABSTRACT 
 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been developed 
within the last decade that is provably secure against 
arbitrary computing power, and even against quantum 
computer attacks. Now there is a strong need of 
research to exploit this technology in the existing 
communication networks. In this paper we have 
presented various experimental results pertaining to 
QKD like Raw key rate and Quantum bit error rate 
(QBER). We found these results over 25 km single 
mode optical fiber. The experimental setup 
implemented the enhanced version of BB84 QKD 
protocol. Based upon the results obtained, we have 
presented a network design which can be implemented 
for the realization of large scale QKD networks. 
Furthermore, several new ideas are presented and 
discussed to integrate the QKD technique in the 
classical communication networks.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a technique 
which has been developed for securing data 
transmission by means of quantum mechanical rules 
[1]. QKD was first proposed by Bennett & Brassard in 
1984 [2]. But owing to some technological challenges 
it could not get practical realization. In the beginning 
of 21st century two companies of the world one from 
USA, MagiQ Tech, and another from Switzerland, 
idQuantique, proposed the practical implementation of 
quantum cryptography. The practical realization of 
QKD has opened new directions of research in the area 
of quantum cryptography. Different types of attacks on 
QKD systems and the techniques for their prevention 
have been proposed by the research community [3]. 
Several issues like error-correction and privacy 
amplification for the QKD systems have also been 
raised. At the time of writing this paper QKD is 
assumed to be more protected than any other known 
cryptosystem against classical as well as quantum 
attacks. We tested the QKD using 25 km single mode 
optical fiber and calculated the important parameters 
related to the security of the QKD cryptosystem. In 
this paper we have presented our experimental set up 
and the results obtained.   
 
Another hot issue of research is to exploit the QKD 
technology in the existing networks to achieve highest 
degree of security. The purpose of practically realizing 
the QKD is to find ways to establish a QKD network. 
In this regard the main concern is to integrate the QKD 
in the existing communication infrastructure. In this 
paper, we have presented a new model of QKD 
network which can be implemented without using any 
far-reaching technology which is not present today. 
Several issues about the improvement and practical 
implementation of this model are also discussed. 
 
2. OUR QKD EXPERIMENT 
 
We designed a simple point-to-point QKD network by 
using the QKD emitter and receiver from Swiss 
company idQuantique. The two panels of emitter and 
receiver are conventionally named as Alice and Bob 
respectively. Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. QKD Emitter & Receiver From 
idQuantique 
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There are two communication channels between Alice 
and Bob. One is classical communication channel and 
the other is quantum communication channel. The two 
panels are directly connected to each other through 
quantum communication channel which is a single 
mode optical fiber. We use single mode optical fiber 
because of the fact that in multimode optical fiber the 
modes couple easily, acting on the qubit like a non-
isolated environment [1]. Hence multimode fibers are 
not appropriate as quantum channels. The quantum 
communication channel is capable of transmitting 
photons from Alice to Bob. Alice and Bob are 
indirectly connected to each other through two 
computers which are directly connected to each other 
through classical communication link. The whole 
network design is shown in figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Simple Point-to-Point QKD Network 
 
2.1. Specifics of our QKD Test Bed   
 
The principle of the QKD auto compensating setup 
which is explained in detail in [1], is such that the key 
is encoded in the phase between two pulses traveling 
from Alice to Bob and back, see figure 3. A strong 
laser pulse at the rate of 1550 nm emitted at Bob is 
separated at a 50/50 beam splitter. The two pulses 
impinge on the input ports of a polarization beam 
splitter (PBS), after having traveled through a long arm 
and a short arm, including a phase modulator and a 
50ns delay line, respectively. All fibers and optical 
elements at Bob are polarization maintaining. The 
linear polarization is turned by  in the short arm 
therefore the two pulses exit Bob’s setup by the same 
port of PBS. The pulses travel down to Alice, are 
reflected on a Faraday Mirror, attenuated and come 
back orthogonally polarized. In turn both pulses now 
take the other path at bob and arrive at the same time at 
beam splitter where they interfere. They are then 
detected either in one detector (D1), or after passing 
through the circulator in another detector (D2). Since 
the two pulses take the same path, inside Bob in a 
reversed order, this interferometer is auto-
compensated. To implement the BB84 protocol, Alice 
applies a phase shift of (
°90
=Aφ  0 or π ) and 
 ( =Aφ 2π  or 23π ) on the second pulse with is phase 
modulator PMA. Bob chooses the measurement basis 
by applying ( =Bφ  0 or 2π ) shift on the first pulse on 
its way back. The photon counters are Peltier-cooled, 
actively gated, InGaS/InP APDs [10]. The dark count 
noise of the detectors is around 10-5 per gate. The 
variable attenuator (VA) at Alice is set to a low level 
and bright laser pulses are emitted by Bob. The time 
delay between the triggering of the laser and a train of 
gates of the detectors is scanned until the reflected 
pulses are detected. The delays between the the two 
2.5ns detection gates are adjusted, as well as the timing 
of the 50 ns pulse applied on the phase modulator PMB. 
For a storage line measuring approximately 10 km, a 
pulse train contains 480 pulses at a frequency of 5 
MHz. A 90% coupler (BS10/90) directs most of the 
incoming light pulses to an APD-detector module 
(DA). It generates the trigger signal used to 
synchronize the Alice’s 20 MHz clock with the one of 
Bob. This synchronized clock allows Alice to apply a 
50 ns pulse at the phase modulator PMA exactly when 
the second weak pulse passes. Only this second pulse 
contains the phase information and must be attenuated 
below the one photon per pulse level. Further details 
may be requested from idQuantique.    
 
 
 
Figure 3. Schematic of QKD Prototype  
 
2.2. Experimental Results 
 
We tested the QKD network in the laboratory using the 
25 Km single mode optical fiber spool featuring the 
losses of approximately 11 dB. The average number of 
photons per pulse was taken as 1.0=µ . As the raw 
key creation rate (Rraw), see [7] for its detailed 
description, is one of the important parameters to 
characterize the performance of QKD systems. We 
calculated Rraw with the following formula. 
 
 
Emitter Receiver
Internet 
Classical Communication Channel
Quantum Communication Channel  
(Single mode Optical Fiber) 
PC PC 
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Rraw= dtq ηµνη                (1) 
 
where q is the systematic factor, which is 0.5 for four 
state BB84 protocol, µ is the average number of 
photons per pulse,ν is the repetition frequency which 
is 5 MHZ in our case, dη is the quantum detection 
efficiency and tη is the transmission efficiency. We 
found the raw key rate of about 490Hz. 
  
The quantum bit error rate (QBER) which is also an 
important parameter to characterize the QKD system 
was found to be 4.5%. Generally the QBER is given as 
  
countscorrectcountsfalse
countsfalse
countstotal
countsfalseQBER
__
_
_
_
+==
 
 
The purpose of our experiment is to practically analyze 
the feasibility of this QKD setup to design the specific 
QKD network in which this QKD technology can be 
practically implemented with minor modifications. 
Several international research groups have tested the 
QKD with varying successful results, as shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Experimental Realization of QKD by 
Different Groups 
 
Group Distance  [km] 
µ  Rraw[Hz] Measured QBER 
Geneva 22.8 0.1 486 4.5 % 
BT 25 0.15 500 2 % 
Los Alamos 24 0.4 20 1.6 % 
 
Today many companies are investing in quantum-
cryptography systems. IBM’s Almaden Research Center, 
the NEC Research Institute, Toshiba, and Hewlett-
Packard are on the brink of introducing products. In 
March 2004, NEC scientists in Japan sent a single photon 
over a 150-km fiber-optic link [5], breaking the 
transmission distance record for quantum cryptography. 
To date, most commercially viable QKD systems rely on 
fiber-optic links limited to 100 to 120 km. At longer 
distances, random noise degrades the photon stream. 
Quantum keys cannot travel far over fiber optic lines, and, 
thus, they can work only between computers directly 
connected to each other. To overcome the distance 
limitation problem and to extend the QKD technology 
into a network of multiple users we present a QKD 
network model in the next section. 
 
3. PROPOSED MODEL FOR QKD 
NETWORK 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Quantum Cellular Network 
 
We present the idea of a quantum cell which is a basic 
building block of our simple QKD network. Just like 
mobile cellular system this network consists of cells, 
see figure 4. The quantum network cell consists of a 
number of Quantum Network Clients (QNC) and one 
quantum base station (QBS). The QBS acts as a central 
junction for all the QNCs. The communication link 
between the QBSs of adjacent cells is a single mode 
optical fiber of approximately 100 km. QBS also acts 
as a gateway for the clients located in the other 
quantum network cells. The QBS can be thought of as 
a simple quantum relay, see figure 5.  
 
The idea resembles, in some way, to the LAN enclaves 
introduced in [4]. The QBS performs the function of 
an eavesdropper whose strategy is the well known 
intercept-resend attack [7]. The QBS acts as a trusted 
member of the quantum cellular network. The fact 
which must be kept in mind is that the use of  the 
trusted QBS will result in low key generation rate, 
which imposes some limitations on the number of 
QBS’s in the whole network. The whole quantum 
cellular network is designed without any far reaching 
technology like quantum repeaters using entanglement 
swapping [8] or teleportation [9]. 
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Figure 5. A Single Quantum Network Cell 
 
3.1. Protocol for the Quantum Cellular 
Network   
 
We present a protocol which may be thought of as an 
extension of the well known BB84 protocol [2]. The 
two QNCs need to share a secret key via the QBS. The 
QBS is equipped with a quantum random number 
generator. Steps of the protocol are as follows.  
 
Step 1: The two QNCs who wish to share a secret key 
inform QBS through classical communication 
channel. 
Step 2: The QBS generates a random sequence of 
qubits, by using quantum random number 
generator (QRNG), called the raw key, and 
sends it to both the QNCs who want to share 
the secret key through quantum 
communication channel. 
Step 3: Each QNC measures each qubit randomly in 
one of the two measurement basis. The 
probability that the two QNCs used the same 
basis for each qubit is 50%. 
Step 4: The two QNCs use the classical 
communication channel to tell QBS about their 
basis of measurement for each qubit. The 
probability that the three parties used the same 
basis of measurement is now 25%. 
Step 5: The QBS informs each QNC through classical 
communication channel about the qubits on 
which the three parties are agreed. So that 
sifting can be accomplished.      
Step 6: Finally, the error correction and privacy 
amplification process is done between the two 
QNCs. 
 
The point of interest, at this moment, is that the keys 
generated between the QBS and each of the QNCs, say 
QNC1 and QNC2, are different. Since there are some 
sets of basis on which the two of the three parties are 
agreed. There is also a possibility of a set of basis on 
which all the three parties do not agree. See Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Creation of Different Keys with 
Respect to Different Measurement Basis 
 
 QNC1 QBS QNC2  
1 xσ  xσ  xσ  Secret Key 
2 xσ  xσ  yσ  Partial Secret key 
3 xσ  yσ  xσ  No secret key 
4 xσ  yσ  yσ  Partial Secret key 
5 yσ  yσ  yσ  Secret Key 
6 yσ  yσ  xσ  Partial Secret key 
7 yσ  xσ  yσ  No secret key 
8 yσ  xσ  xσ  Partial Secret key 
 
As shown in the above protocol that QBS is released 
after the process of sifting and is not involved in the 
error-correction and privacy amplification phase. But 
one thing which must be taken into account is that the 
QBS contains the same raw qubits which QNCs posses 
and QBS has the full access to the public channel 
which QNCs are using for error-correction and privacy 
amplification phase. Hence there is a large possibility 
that QBS finds the secret key which is very similar, but 
not completely identical, to the one shared by QNC1 
and QNC2. But for a good estimation we assume that 
the QBS is so efficient that it can calculate the same 
secret key shared by QNC1 and QNC2. Hence the QBS 
must be considered as a trusted member of the whole 
process. 
 
3.2. Distance Extension & Inter-Cell 
Communication 
 
In view of today’s technology, QKD is possible to a 
maximum range of about 100km due to the losses in 
the fiber [1]. Consider the situation in which the two 
parties who wish to share a secret key are located far 
apart that the distance between them is about more 
than 200km. In our quantum cellular network we must 
place these parties in different cells with multiple 
QBSs involved.   
QNC 
QNC 
QNC 
QNC 
QNC 
QNC 
QNC 
QBS 
Quantum Network Client (QNC) 
Quantum Base Station (QBS) 
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It seems apparently that the size of the secret key 
decreases with the number of parties involved in the 
QKD process increases. As in the standard BB84 
protocol 50% of the raw qubits are discarded and the 
other 50% which is a sifted key is used for extracting 
the actual secret key. But in the presence of our QBS, 
the sifted key would be the only 25% of the total raw 
key or the probability of having the same basis among 
three parties is ¼. The length of the sifted key is 
inversely proportional to the number of QBS’s 
involved. Hence for n QBS’s the probability of having 
the same measurement basis among all parties is 1/2n+1.  
 
The solution of this problem is an improved protocol 
in which the two QNCs i.e. (QNC1 and QNCN) share a 
secret key passing through N QBSs or N Cells. The 
protocol is described as follows: 
 
Step 1: The two QNCs who wish to share a secret key 
inform their respective QBS’s i.e. (QBS1 and 
QBSN) through classical communication 
channel. 
Step 2: All the QBS’s which are equipped with the 
QRNG generate a random secret key and share 
that key with their next QBS by means of 
standard BB84 protocol through quantum 
communication channels. 
Step 3: QBS1 sends a random sequence of raw qubits 
to QNC1 and calculates its XOR with the key 
shared between QBS1 and its next QBS say 
QBS2. 
Step 4: QBS1 sends the XORed raw key to QBS2 
through classical channel.  
Step 5: Step 4 is repeated until it reaches  QBSN. 
Step 6: QBSN prepares the raw qubits with the 
received XORed key and sends the original 
raw qubits to QNCN through quantum 
communication link, so that both the QNC1 
and QNCN receive the same raw qubits.  
Step 7: Sifting is accomplished between the two 
QNCs. 
Step 8: Finally, the error correction and privacy 
amplification process is accomplished between 
QNC1 and QNCN. 
 
The advantage of this protocol is that the final secret 
key does not shrink with the increasing number of 
QBSs. In the whole process it is assumed that our QBS 
has enough intelligence to route the whole cellular 
network. Details will be studied in the proceeding 
research work. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper we tried to introduce a simple quantum 
communication network model. This model may be 
implemented using the technology, available today. 
The purpose of our proposed network model is to 
exploit the available QKD technology in the practical 
networks on large scale.  
 
We have provided the solution of two problems of 
QKD networks. First is the distance limitation between 
two parties, sharing a secret quantum key. We solve 
this problem by introducing the trusted quantum base 
stations (QBS) in our network model. Second 
limitation of the QKD technology is that it has not 
been realized in a network involving a large number of 
Alices and Bobs. Our network model overcomes this 
problem by providing the cell based network design. 
 
There are various issues pertaining to our network 
design like routing solutions among various QBSs and 
eavesdropping etc. which would be studied in the 
future research. 
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